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Abstract
This study is designed to help practitioners prepare and evaluate institutional reforms for education
and health programs. It provides an analytic framework for use by public officials and researchers,
with case studies that illustrate a wide range of actual practice, and a set of lessons learned. The
framework uses the concept of “accountability” to link the broad goals of reform to the key
dimensions of organizational arrangements. The case studies, based on fieldwork in Mexico and
Nicaragua, demonstrate a wide variety of available policy instruments. Significantly, they also
demonstrate that the responses to these instruments are equally various: creative interpretation of
central regulations by local officials, self governing schools that complement public funds with
resources mobilized by fees, the reassertion of national control over previously decentralized health
programs. A lot of attention is paid to the “how” of reform; the process of implementation is at least
as important as the question of “what” is to be reformed. The lessons derived from these experiences
emphasize contingent, rather than absolute, recommendations.  Overall, the study suggests how
success in achieving  greater efficiency, equity and democracy in the management and delivery of
social services requires a careful balance of centralized and decentralized responsibilities.
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Section I: Decentralization and Recentralization: Building a Framework
for Analysis, Summary of Cases, & Lessons Learned
A. Project Goals and Concepts
1. Nobody, it seems, can oppose decentralization. Throughout Latin America reforms have been
proposed in the name of decentralization by parties of widely different ideology. And, in all fairness,
there is a substantial body of theory to back this political enthusiasm. However, even after two
decades of quite extraordinary activity, we know very little about the impact of these reforms,
particularly in the social sectors. Helping fill this gap is the over arching purpose of the study. We
examine how four specific cases of reform have actually worked.
2. The concept of decentralization is often as vague as it is popular. So the study begins by setting
out a framework for analyzing what it is that social sector reforms are trying to achieve. We argue
that in an effort to improve the outcomes of service provision decentralization reforms try to
strengthen performance accountability. That is, the transfer of  authority to lower level or local
agencies is seen as an instrument for improving the way that services are delivered, by making the
people who supply the service more directly accountable for their performance.  However, by
disaggregating the different aspects of  accountability our framework makes clear that, in many
respects, the expected improvement  requires both greater autonomy for the local service provider,
and  also strengthened performance of some  central functions. We refer to this necessary
strengthening of central functions as recentralization.
3.This explains the title of the report and the principal message of the study: for decentralization to
produce the results so widely expected and so badly needed, the reform of social services must pay
attention to changing and strengthening the functions of both local and central agencies. The case
studies presented here are important in their own right and have interesting lessons for other countries
and other services. They also show how using the suggested framework can help government officials
and Bank staff design these reforms in a comprehensive fashion. A simplified example will give a
foretaste of our discussion. Many social sector reforms seek to give the units that directly deliver a
service to the public greater discretion over how to use their budget. This is correctly understood to
be the heart of decentralization. However,  a strong central commitment to mobilize financing and
help distribute information about local peformance, is likely to significantly enhance the extent  and
sustainability of local service improvement. We can go further. In many cases, if responsibility for
mobilizing financing is decentralized at the same time as expenditure discretion, service delivery could
deteriorate badly for many low income families.
4. The report has three main sections. The remainder of this first section develops a set of goals that
are the basis of sound institutional reform policies. Next, we develop a practical analytical framework
for studying accountability in  social sector decentralization reforms. We then describe the four case
studies, summarize our findings, and present the most generalizable lessons learned. This first section,
thus serves as both an introduction to the theory and an extended summary of the study as a whole.
Section II presents the case studies of educational reforms in Mexico and Nicaragua and draws case-
specific lessons learned. Section III does the same for the  case studies of health care reforms.
Throughout, we do not emphasize blanket evaluations (e.g., X is better than Y), but rather-2-
comparative evaluations such as “If X, then the problems will be A and the disadvantages will be B.”
B. Decentralization & Recentralization: Why Do We Care?
5. There is a  wide-spread perception that overly-centralized systems of both financing and providing
government services have led to huge inefficiencies and poor service delivery, as well as inequalities
in resource distribution. These undesirable outcomes arise largely through the mismanagement of
resources and an inability to match service provision with demand. One can begin to discern several
lines of argument in favor of decentralization. However, when examined in more detail, it becomes
ap Theparent that achieving greater efficiency and equity often requires both decentralization and
strengthening of central functions, or recentralization. How can we determine what functions are best
carried out at each level. The concept of subsidiarity,  provides a rule of thumb: push responsibility
for service provision to the lowest level possible (to promote participatory democracy and achieve the
efficiency gains from matching services to citizen preferences) without sacrificing 1) efficiency
through failing to account for externalities,  spillovers, or economies of scale associated with those
services or 2) equity/redistributional concerns.
6. Box 1 sets out in more detail how this general rule of thumb can be developed.
Efficiency and Fiscal Resources Arguments for Decentralization and Recentralization
7. The first line of argument, we call the efficiency argument. We can discern essentially three
different aspects of the efficiency argument, and we later seek evidence for each in the cases:
8. Production efficiency is achieved when a desired output is achieved for the lowest cost in terms of
the resources used to produce it. (Or, when output is maximized for a given cost.)  It may also be
called technical efficiency. The argument for decentralization here stems from the belief that sub-
national levels of government may more effectively choose input mixes to achieve a desired level of
output.  In addition, they may manage resources more effectively: this may occur through a) a
reduction in bureaucratic red tape; b) more appropriate and effective management styles; or c) greater
accountability to the populace on the part of sub-national officials with respect to how expenditures
and investments are made. On the other hand, service provision must be produced or regulated in
order to account for externalities and spillovers.  In addition, if sub-national administrative capacity
is weak, then the central government must either take steps to improve it, or continue to use its
expertise to provide services directly. This point holds particularly true for evaluation.
9. Allocative Efficiency involves matching the bundles of services provided with the preferences and
needs of the population receiving them. The argument for decentralization in this respect is based on
the supposition that sub-national levels of government are closer to the population they serve and
therefore more capable of discerning local priorities and designing programs to meet them. 
10. However, it is well accepted that national governments have the greatest capacity for inter-
regional distributive policies, reallocating resources from wealthier jurisdictions to poorer ones. They
may also have more capacity for inter-personal transfers. The logic is that the mobility of constituents
makes redistributive policies inefficient if pursued too vigorously at the sub-national level. In
addition, centralized allocation may be less vulnerable to capture by local elites.  But, if the goal of
improved service provision is met through increased production efficiency, then it stands to reason-3-
that services may improve for disadvantaged groups, which could improve inter-regional and inter-
personal equity despite the persistence of regional disparities.
TABLE 1: Key Goals & Working Hypotheses for Decentralization & Recentralization
Reforms 
Efficiency & Fiscal Resources Arguments for Decentralization & Recentralization
Decentralization Recentralization
Production 1.  Sub-national governments may choose input mixes 3.  National governments must account for externalities and
Efficiency and/or develop programs and policies more effectively spillovers related to national goals.
than national governments.
2.  Sub-national governments may manage resources more for evaluation and institution building in weak sub-national
efficiently than national governments by: a) Reducing jurisdictions, and greater capacity for disseminating good
bureaucratic red tape; b) Implementing more practice. In addition, evaluation mechanisms must be
appropriate/effective personnel  management; c) comparable across jurisdictions and the national government
Accounting more to stakeholders regarding how funds are must rely on comprehensive evaluation measures both for
spent national planning and to hold sub-national jurisdictions
4.  National governments may have more expertise, particularly
accountable for use of national funds.
Allocative effective targeting of the poor populations. local elites and interest groups.
Efficiency
5.  Sub-national governments know their constituents 7.  Central government has greatest capacity for  inter-regional
better than national governments and therefore provide and inter-personal redistributive policies.
services that more closely match citizen preferences.
There may also be improved equity through more 8.  Centralized allocation may be less vulnerable to capture by
6.  If reforms improve services for disadvantaged groups,
equity may improve despite regional disparities.
Fiscal 10.  As with #5 above, sub-national governments can set 12.  Sub-national governments can run deficits that in extreme
Efficiency and some limited number of taxes and/or user fees in a more cases can threaten macro stability.
Fiscal efficient and responsive manner with respect to the
Resources  regional/local economy, households and other 11. Importantly, greater sub-national fiscal responsibility may
9.  National governments can use leverage from fiscal 11.  Many important taxes (e.g., consumption [value added]
transfers to stimulate economically efficient  and/or taxes and income taxes) may be handled most efficiently and
socially beneficial behavior by sub-national governments.  equitably at the national level. 
stakeholders. This may augment the public resource base. throw regions more to the mercy of their own endowments, thus
increasing inequity nationally.
Democracy/Power Sharing Arguments for Decentralization & Recentralization
Decentralization Recentralization
12. If reforms allow true power sharing, then democratic 13. Improved power sharing assumes functioning sub-national
political participation and/or political stability could be democratic institutions, which are notoriously weak in many
improved. Political equity may also improve. countries in the region. (See #8 above).
14. Fiscal Efficiency and Fiscal Resources are actually a hybrid of production and allocative
efficiency, and relate to the intergovernmental fiscal relations involved with the financing or provision
of services by sub-national governments. As Campbell (1991: 7) notes, there are two dimensions: a)
the structure of intergovernmental grants and other fiscal relations and b) the impact that sub-national
budgets can have on the national macro-economy.
15. It is often argued that decentralization can augment and strengthen the overall resource base for
services provided at all levels of government. This occurs because: 1) sub-national governments
and/or other stakeholders can be induced, through matching grants and other intergovernmental fiscal
mechanisms, to increase their contributions to service provision and tax efforts ; and 2) their-4-
proximity to the urban business population (particularly the poorer segments of it like the informal
sector) and other stakeholders may allow subnational governments to tax or charge fees more
effectively for the services demanded, thus taking advantage of revenue sources untapped under more
centralized  regimes. (Bahl and Linn (1991) and DeSoto (1990)
16. The potential for tapping these new resources is, however, limited by the same forces that make
the central government more effective at redistribution; thus most important taxes will be handled
most efficiently and equitably at the national level. This calls for revenue raising potential to remain
largely at the national level to avoid throwing regions at the mercy of their wealth and endowments,
while augmenting service provision at the sub-national level through a system of fiscal transfers.
These transfers should be constructed in such a way to use central leverage to stimulate economically
efficient and socially beneficial behavior. (See Winble 1998 & IDB 1994)
Democracy/Power Sharing Arguments for Decentralization and Recentralization
17. While decentralization may adversely impact inter-regional equity, it also has been supported as
a means to promote democracy and equity.  It may permit increased sharing of power and more
effective methods of addressing the needs of the poorest segments of the population. The popular
impression of central government officials is that they live far away and out of touch with the needs
and desires of local populations; therefore, strengthening sub-national officials' positions via
decentralization of actual power over decision-making may improve democratic decision making and
lead eventually to the strengthening of sub-national political institutions. Power sharing can magnify
the perception of political equity, a phenomenon equally important as equity in the purely economic
sense. Gains in national political stability that grow from a greater sense of equitable sharing of
power can play an instrumental role in supporting the central government’s efforts for macro-
economic stability. Thus, the power sharing aspects of decentralization relate in some respect to the
fiscal efficiency argument. The caveat here, of course, is that democratic power sharing can only
occur if sub-national democratic institutions exist and function.  Where they are weak, the central
government must use its expertise to help foster them.
18. In addition the redistribution of power in the social sectors often involves powerful lobbying and
interest  groups at the national level as well as different levels of government. For instance,
educational decentralization in Mexico necessarily implied a shift in the power structure away from
the extremely powerful national teacher's union. Indeed, many analysts view this as the primary
political aim of the decentralization in Mexico. The extent to which this actually happened is explored
in the case.
19. Having laid out the goals of institutional reform, we now discuss how we analyzed the means by
which governments have tried to achieve these goals through policies called “decentralization.” Many
reforms gain the label "decentralization" when it is not entirely clear that the term is appropriate.
20. In practice this reform environment contains constantly evolving elements of decentralization and
recentralization. Performance accountability emphasizes the need to determine 1) who is responsible
for what aspects of service provision? 2) how do the incentives inherent in these arrangements try to
encourage effective service provision? And 3) given these first two determinations, how well does the
actual service provision arrangement function?.-5-
21. Table 2 sets out the main aspects of the framework. It consists of the seven aspects or dimensions
that we have found to be critical to examine what  reforms can actually do to increase accountability.
Table 2: Framework for Analyzing Accountability in "Decentralizing" Social Service
Delivery Systems
 Seven Important Aspects for Consideration:
I. FINANCE
Revenue Authority, central and sub-national
Expenditures Authority, central and sub-national
Grants-in-Aid and Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers
II. AUDITING & EVALUATION 





III. REGULATION & POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Developing/Designing Regulations
Implementing/Enforcing Regulations




V. DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS  (National, Regional, and Local)
Voting
Citizen Participation/Local & Grassroots Organizations
Conflict Resolution
VI. SERVICE PROVIDER CHOICE/MIX 
Public, Private, and Nonprofit (NGO) Provision
Civic Society and Civil Associations
VII. CIVIL SERVICE & (Personnel & Information) MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
C. Summary of Case Studies 
22. By choosing cases in Mexico and Nicaragua, we aimed to draw lessons from both a large, federal
country and a small, unitary one. The cases were also chosen for their intrinsic importance and their
potential to yield useful insights. In Mexico, the reforms explored primarily involve the transfer of
some responsibilities in both the health and education sectors from the federal level to the states. In
Nicaragua, some of the reforms are similar, emphasizing the transfer of service responsibility and
administration from the central government to either a department-level or municipal-level entity.
However, one of the reforms, the Autonomous Schools Program, involves a transfer of significant
budget, planning, and administrative powers to the site-level (schools in this case). We consider this
a much bolder and certainly rarer reform (though not necessarily better) and thus we spend
considerable time exploring this case in Section II.2. Below, we briefly describe the four case studies
and present brief applications of the framework for each in Tables 3-7.  Each of these figures serves
also to provide a concise summary of the most important aspects of the respective reforms.
Education Cases
Case #1. Mexican Educational Decentralization, 1992-1996, Federal-to-state transfer of Primary-6-
& Secondary education administration. Case Study States: Hidalgo, Guanajuato, & Zacatecas
23. In 1978, the Federal Government created state-level, Federal “delegations” (state-level, Federal
authorities) but kept financing centralized (80% federal) via discretionary transfers. States, to varying
degrees, developed their own, independent public school systems. In 1992, the Federal delegations
and all personnel, property, and expenditure responsibilities were officially transferred to the states,
but the substantive meaning of this reform, according to the different aspects of the framework, is
unclear. Financing remains approximately 80% federal, and transfers are done through annually
negotiated transfers. Municipal and school level councils were part of the decentralization legislation,
but they do not appear to function (i.e., they do not even exist) and there is little indication that this
is changing in the near future. Finally, for better or worse, Mexico’s decentralization “sequence” has
now been in motion for nearly two decades, and undergone at least two very different types of
decentralization reform, providing ample experience for current analysis.
24.Table 3, a summary of the application of the framework to the recent Mexican educational
reforms, shows in what ways we determined the system has changed since the 1992 legislation. The
framework proves useful in highlighting that in fact it is difficult to call the Mexican educational
reforms “decentralization.” However, in some aspects there has been a transfer of power .
Case #2. Nicaraguan Educational Decentralization, 1993-1996: the Municipalization and
Autonomous Schools Programs. Case Study Departments: Managua, Matagalpa, and León.
25. Municipalization: In a limited number of locales (10 out of 143 municipalities), schools are now
the immediate responsibility of municipalities. Municipal Education Councils, led by the mayor and
the local representative of the central Ministry of Education, have been established in a broader
number of locales. This is a more traditional “decentralization” scheme, which involves transferring
some responsibilities for administration from central to sub-national governments. 
26. Autonomous Schools Program (ASP): A bold move to school-based management in which school
councils are established, the school budget is transferred from the Ministry to the school, and
additional fees are charged of parents. School councils have considerable authority over how to use
the fees collected, and thus far most fees go toward increasing teachers salaries. The program grew
out of ministerial mandates, not legislated changes in the general law, and has so far yielded uneven
results, particularly with respect to equity issues. The reforms took place first, before much
institutional development, and only now are accounting systems and arrangements for technical
assistance being developed by the central government.
Table 3: Brief Application of Framework for Analyzing Accountability
Mexican Education Reforms, 1992-1996-7-
Framework Aspect Comment/Summary Judgement
I. Finance Relatively unchanged authority for central and sub-national governments. No change
at all on the revenue side. Very little change on the expenditure side: Federal government
continues to determine transfers to states based on yearly budget negotiations, although states
do literally spend the money, which they did not do before. States have only slightly more
control over how to spend than before 1992. Some recentralization from the Federal role
negotiating salaries for all teachers, not just those in the formerly separate Federal system.
States given no ability via grants-in-aid (such as matching mechanism) to alter the size of the
transfer, other than non-transparent yearly budget negotiations.
II. Auditing & Evaluation (Financial,
Performance, Operational, & Program)
Central government transferred only financial auditing responsibility. The Ministry no
longer does very much due to state autonomy. Little change in quantitative evaluation
systems. States developing some evaluation geared towards creating qualitative complements
to the Ministry evaluation. States have same responsibility to provide basic data, but the
Ministry may have less ability to verify, due to state autonomy.
III. Regulation & Policy Development Officially, central authority is unchanged. States, however, finding more room to
maneuver developing programs officially against Ministry norms.
IV. Demand-driven Mechanisms (Expression
of Demand)
No change. No vouchers or other traditional demand-driven reforms. Some increased state
interest in polling stakeholder priorities though qualitative evaluations and survey.
V. Democratic Mechanisms (Voting, Citizen
Participation, & Conflict Resolution)
Officially, no change. Perhaps some democratic impact: state governors are (arguably)
closer to the electorate than central officials and now have more control over the sector: they
appoint the state’s education secretary who has the few increased powers described in aspects
III and VII. Official support of citizen participation, but not many successful examples of its
taking root.
VI. Service Provider Choice/Mix (Public,
Private, and NGO Provision)
No change. No inclusion of private sector. Very little parental choice to pick schools. Little
change in the differentiation between formerly separate Federal and state school systems.
Little or no involvement of NGOs and other civil associations compared to other countries in
the region.
VII. Civil Service and Management Systems Significant transfer of central authority. Teachers and most administrators are now state
employees. States have increased control of bureaucratic shape and functions, as well as
allocation of teachers across geographic areas and sub-sectors of basic education (preschool,
primary school & secondary school). Still, however, states face significant resistance from
both union and Federal influence over hiring and placement.
27. Tables 4 and 5 present our brief application of the framework to these two programs. The ASP
exhibits a relatively high level of change and transfer of central authority along most of the seven
important aspects for consideration. Municipalization, on the other hand, has effected fewer changes.
Both programs, though very young, show initial promise for improving accountability and educational
outcomes in Nicaragua.-8-
Table 4-- Brief Application of Framework for Analyzing Accountability Autonomous
Schools Program, Nicaragua
Framework Aspect Comment/Summary Judgement
I. Finance Significant transfer of central authority to schools: Though the Ministry continues to
finance the system centrally, contributions to schools from parents now play a growing role
in resources available to schools. Schools have greater control on the expenditure side:
principals and school councils have increased discretion over spending patterns. Local
councils can alter centrally suggested fee levels. However, there is a strong, if non-
transparent, central role in financially supporting poor autonomous schools. Regarding
grants-in-aid, the Ministry uses newly-developed grants to autonomous schools to transfer
resources for salaries, benefits, routine maintenance, and perhaps utilities based on
capitation principles and average costs at the school before autonomy. But transfers are not
truly formula driven. 
II. Auditing & Evaluation (Financial,
Performance, Operational, & Program)
Moderate transfer of central authority: Very little change in central functions, which rely
on a small number of random audits and analysis of departmental performance reviews.
Some increased vigilance on the part of parents and teachers due to interest in school fees.
School and Municipal councils perform program evaluations, but may be ineffective due to
lack of sufficient training. Large on-going central evaluation of ASP undertaken with World
Bank support. 
III. Regulation & Policy Development Little change in central authority: Norms, standards, text books and basic curriculum still
developed centrally. Local councils have some leeway in 1) developing curriculum, though
they have done so little in practice and 2) text selection, though the Ministry only pays for
their own. Little or no attention by local actors to improving teaching methods.  Central
Ministry has recently implemented new teaching methods (metodología activa), which have
proven popular with teachers (Fuller & Rivarola, 1998).
IV. Demand-driven Mechanisms
(Expression of Demand)
Significant change in some schools: Required, voluntary, and (in come cases) extorted fees
reflect and influence parental demand for schooling, especially at the secondary level.
Participation of parents in local councils provide community input to provision of services.
V. Democratic Mechanisms (Voting,
Citizen Participation, & Conflict
Resolution)
Significant transfer of central authority de jure; varied results de facto: Where school
councils function according to norms, parents, through elected representatives, are given
significant voice in school policy including budget, personnel, and curriculum. Principals
are elected by the school councils.
VI. Service Provider Choice/Mix (Public,
Private, and NGO Provision)
Little change: though autonomous schools represent a significant change in school
administration, the public sector is still responsible for service provision. Parents do not
have increased capacity to choose schools via vouchers or other mechanisms. NGOs and
private organizations do not run autonomous schools. While NGOs and other civic
organizations play a significant role in education, their role has not necessarily changed as a
result of the autonomous schools program. School administrative structure may, however,
facilitate civic involvement. 
VII. Civil Service and Management
Systems
Very significant change in central authority: principals and the school councils gain
considerable control over management of personnel and budget.  Municipal-level Ministry
delegates are the front line, having gained primary responsibility for recruiting and
overseeing autonomous schools, training participants, and resolving disputes. -9-
Table 5-- Brief Application of Framework for Analyzing Accountability Municipalization
Program, Nicaragua
Framework Aspect Comment/Summary Judgement
I. Finance Moderate/Low-Level transfer of central authority: The Ministry controls school revenues and
transfers funds for school personnel to municipal governments, which provide no substantial
funding. As a result of increased involvement in education, they do, however, 1) support
municipal-level Ministry delegates more through provision of small but useful contributions, such
as the use of municipal vehicles; 2) sometimes allocate resources for school rehabilitation; and 3)
prioritize school construction in project proposals to the central government’s social and
infrastructure development fund (FISE). Regarding grants-in-aid, the Ministry transfers resources
for school personal to municipalities, whose primary responsibility is to administer the payroll
system. Transfers are not sizable enough to provide municipal governments with any discretion
over the allocation of funds. 
II. Auditing & Evaluation
(Financial, Performance,
Operational, & Program)
Little transfer of central authority: Very little change in official central functions, which rely on
a small number of random audits and analysis of departmental performance reviews. Some
increased vigilance on the part of municipal and departmental  government, parents and teachers
due to participation in municipal councils. Municipal councils perform program evaluations, but
may be ineffective due to lack of sufficient training.
III. Regulation & Policy
Development
Very little change in central authority: Norms, standards, text books and basic curriculum still
developed centrally. Local councils have some leeway in 1) developing curriculum, though they
have done so little in practice and 2) text selection, though the Ministry only pays for their own.




Low/Moderate-level transfer of central authority: To the extent that mayors are more
accessible to citizenry than central government officials and have some increased control over the
system (see II and III above), parents may have more ability to lobby and express priorities.





Moderate transfer of central authority de jure; varied results de facto: Where municipal
councils function according to norms, parents, through elected representatives, are given some
voice in school policy including personnel and curriculum. System is administered locally by




Little change: public sector still provides and regulates schools. No vouchers or significant school
choice. While NGOs and other civic organizations play a significant role in education, their role
has not necessarily changed as a result of Municipalization. Municipal involvement may,
however, facilitate civic involvement.
VII. Civil Service and
Management Systems
Moderate transfer of central authority: Municipal governments administer payroll and other
personnel transactions. Municipal councils may hire and fire principals and teachers. Municipal-
level Ministry delegates have gained primary responsibility for coordinating Ministry-municipal
relations.
Health Cases
Case #3. Mexican Health Care for the Uninsured 1982-1996. Case Study States: Hidalgo,
Morelos, & Jalisco
28. By most accounts (e.g., Gonzalez-Block [1995]) decentralized health reform in Mexico has not
proven successful, beneficial, or real. Fourteen states signed an accord and received responsibility
for a very limited set of programs. (We call these “Accord states.”)  Little changed in the remaining
17 states (“Non-accord states”). Control remains heavily centralized, has perhaps negatively affected-10-
equity, and proposed reforms have not taken hold in any universal way throughout the states. In a
sense, this creates an opportunity to establish lessons learned in how NOT to decentralize, and a case
study in the possibility of ineffective (from the point of view of services rendered) recentralization.
At the same time, several aspects of the health care system were integrated and a few partnerships
with the private sector have been initiated.
Table 6: Brief Application of Framework for Analyzing Accountability
Mexican Health Reforms, 1985-1995
Framework Aspect Comment/Summary Judgement
I. Finance Little transfer of central authority. Virtually no new financing arrangements on
the revenue side with the exception of some user fees, now under state control in
Accord states. On the expenditure side, Accord states gained some new control
over the budget (e.g. materials and supplies) but until 1995 no control over
personnel spending, the lion’s share of the budget. In Non-accord states little
changed.  Regarding grants-in-aid, states were given no ability (such as matching
mechanism) to alter the size of the transfer, other than non-transparent yearly
budget negotiations.
II. Auditing & Evaluation (Financial,
Performance, Operational, &
Program)
Virtually no change.  Performance, operational, and program auditing continue to
be federal, largely through the budget-programming process.  Financial auditors
are now located in decentralized states, but power of enforcement remains at the
federal level.     
III. Regulation & Policy Development Moderate transfer of central authority.  Although norms continue to be
developed vertically, some states have developed and implemented innovative
programs and policies within those norms.
IV. Demand-driven Mechanisms
(Expression of Demand)
Moderate transfer of central authority. User fees have doubled as a proportion
of total spending in decentralized states to 9.3%.
V. Democratic Mechanisms (Voting,
Citizen Participation, & Conflict
Resolution)
No change.
VI. Service Provider Choice/Mix
(Public, Private, and NGO Provision)
No change.
VII. Civil Service and Management
Systems
Little transfer of central authority.  States gained only two new powers over
personnel matters, both of which are important but limited in scope: 1) Accord
state health systems absorbed new groups of workers through the merger of a
moderately unpopular state controlled system with a popular and effective Federal
one (IMSS-SOLIDARIDAD), and  2) states could devise a system of integrating
salary structures.  Because the Federal Government has been slow to fill needed
new health posts, some Accord states have increased their pool of state workers,
largely financed via state-controlled user fees.
29. Summarizing the reforms with respect to the accountability framework (Table 6) reveals that it
is hard to call the Mexican health reforms a process of “decentralization,” or even to say that much
was changed. States did not gain a significant level of control over even a single aspect of the system,
and most of the few new powers they did gain have slowly been taken away from them. A
substantively new reform effort, modeled somewhat upon the experience in education, has very
recently been initiated, suggesting that the reform effort we study here (1982-1996) is essentially-11-
over. This case study is, thus, different from the other three, which examine young, nascent reforms
and policy processes in progress. 
Table 7: Brief Application of Framework for Analyzing Accountability
Nicaraguan Health Reforms, 1992-1996 (SILAIS)
Framework Aspect Comment/Summary Judgement
I. Finance Low/Moderate transfer of central authority.  No new financing arrangements on the
revenue side for Ministry services, but new in-patient contracts for Social Security and private
patients give hospitals greater revenue-raising and spending powers (albeit tightly controlled
by national guidelines).  Donor agencies now contribute almost 50% of the health budget, with
some allocation and management by the SILAIS.  On the expenditure side, the mix has
changed moderately--with goods and services, roughly 20% of spending, SILAIS-controlled.
Regarding grants-in-aid, SILAIS were given little ability (such as matching mechanism) to
alter the size of the transfer from the center, but formula transfers have begun to replace
historical budgeting which 1) improves transparency  and 2) in principle rewards SILAIS if
they demonstrate need and responsible spending of annual budgets.
II. Auditing & Evaluation  No change. 
III. Regulation & Policy
Development
Moderate transfer of central authority.  Although norms continue to be developed centrally,
formulas for establishing policy priorities place more responsibility on the SILAIS.
Municipalities also given some role in the policy formulation process.  Some increased policy-




Little transfer of central authority and little central development of such practices. User
fees have been established at both primary and secondary care levels.  Most monies remain at
the unit or SILAIS, but their use and level is circumscribed by national guidelines.  While user
fees almost fully fund laboratory, dental, and other services, they have generated barriers to





Little transfer of central authority and little central development of such practices. More
interaction between the municipalities and their communities. Participatory groups identify





Moderate transfer of central authority. The Ministry  uses public service providers only. 
However, there is a growing presence of fee-for-service NGO providers, particularly for
women’s health services.  A development with significant implications for the Ministry --
particularly its hospitals -- are the Social Security Institute’s and private sector’s new managed
care companies, which contract with public hospitals on a risk or fee-for-service basis for
differentiated (read superior) services and wards.  Regarding civil associations, volunteer
boards officially govern the SILAIS, but how much power they actually have is questionable,
in part because board members are named by the Ministry , and in part due to lack of
experience.  At a national level, a volunteer advisory board for health policy development has
been formed with significant NGO representation, but it has virtually no power.  
VII. Civil Service and
Management Systems
Little transfer of central authority. Center (largely the Ministry of Finance) controls the
personnel portion of the budget. SILAIS have gained some ability to shift personnel within
jurisdictions, but no real ability to hire and fire. -12-
Case #4. Nicaraguan Health Decentralization: Local Integrated Health Care Systems (SILAIS),
Deconcentration/Site-Based  Management/Community. Case Study Departments: Managua,
Chontales, Jinotega,and León.
30. This case is "arms-length decentralization" in the sense that the jurisdictions receiving control over
regional health care provision are central entities. Departmental-level health units are established and
given some control over the supplies budget and local policy development. The center retains control
over much of the regulation, financing and planning of the system. As of 1995 all SILAIS were
governed by unpaid Boards of Directors, made up of local officials, church officers, people working
within the health sector, and "distinguished" community members.  Each SILAIS includes a network
of primary health care units and a secondary level hospital (that offers specialty services in internal
medicine, surgery, pediatrics, and obstetrics/gynecology).  As of February 1996, SILAIS were
authorized to sell services to the social security system or other private purchasers. The World Bank
has helped the center define its role, and the IDB is concentrating on the action at the local level.
31. For the case of the Nicaraguan health sector, decentralization may be characterized as inchoate,
with problem definition and allocative responsibility partially located at 17 departmental level SILAIS
but some transfer of fiscal control -- limited to goods and services, approximately 20 % of the budget.
(Table 7) While the fiscal control transferred for this portion of the budget is extensive, permitting
the flexibility to move expenditures from one budget area to another, the management turnover in the
Ministry of Health, and more importantly, the absence of any binding legislation has considerably
weakened the decentralization effort.
D. Lessons Learned
Does institutional reform have some of the expected effects and achieve some of the desired
goals?
32.  Capacity and effective ideas exist at the sub-national level.  Through all four cases, and indeed
through nearly every sub-national jurisdiction included in the individual cases, we found consistent
evidence of capable administrators ready to develop and implement effective policies -- often with a
clearer focus on clients, a more effective use of resources, and/or innovative programs. While this
may be less true for sub-national jurisdictions in a small country like Nicaragua (e.g. the
departments), this finding is significant because lack of sub-national administrative capacity is often
cited as a major concern regarding transferring control from central government bureaucracies. While
the lack of experience at the sub-national level is by no means a trivial issue (as in the case of the
health sector in the State of Morelos in Mexico), we did not find it as critical as might be expected:
for example, the State of Hidalgo in Mexico handled its new education responsibilities very well, even
with little previous state-level experience. In fact, sometimes the absence of an existing sub-national
bureaucracy can be an advantage. 
33. All four cases, but particularly the Mexican health and education cases, show that sub-national
administrators are crafty at eking out more power and control than they are officially given. Through
scrutinizing legal codes or simply gaining confidence to defy central norms, sub-national authorities
seemed to take “decentralization” reforms, however limited de jure, as signals that they should do
more, de facto.  This is particularly true for regulation and policy development.-13-
34. Naturally, however, even capable administrators will require both training and an effective
intergovernmental incentive environment in order to be effective and accountable. We believe that
sub-national administrators have effective ideas (and the ability to implement them) that have been
stymied by lack of control over the requisite policy levers. The health and education cases in Mexico
support the ideas that 1) state-level officials can and do learn from each other and  2) sub-national
officials can be effective in lobbying the central government for support. They showed both
knowledge of what the central programs could do to support them and innovation in striking deals
with the central programs on arrangements such as providing matching funds. The central government
must continue to play a strong role in supporting the implementation of these ideas, particularly
through providing compensatory programs and access to technical and administrative support.
35. Demand responsiveness occurs and may improve accountability. The Nicaraguan education
case and to some extent the Mexican education and health cases, show that developing demand-driven
mechanisms can play an integral role in reforms that transfer administrative powers away from the
central government. These mechanisms may be developed through central guidelines (as in the
Nicaraguan case) or may arise from the impetus of capable sub-national officials (as in the State of
Guanajuato, Mexico). Radical, demand-driven mechanisms (such as school fees in Nicaragua) may
improve accountability, but they also emphasize the need for effective, central compensatory policies
and regulations to prevent greater inequities. In addition, the Nicaraguan case shows that demand-
driven mechanisms like school fees can be made more responsive and more effective if implemented
in conjunction with effective participatory mechanisms. 
Central government continues to have critical responsibilities: so called “decentralization” may
alter but not actually reduce the central role. Three responsibilities stand out:
36. Technical Support. Central governments must provide technical and administrative support,
especially for weaker and/or poorer jurisdictions. The centrally-provided training for local-level actors
in the Nicaraguan education case is particularly salient.
37. Evaluation. Central evaluation practices are important for disseminating good results, holding
sub-national jurisdictions accountable, and identifying areas for national planning. Unfortunately, we
must make this point mostly through highlighting the absence of good central evaluation in the four
cases. On the other hand, different forms of evaluation, monitoring, and dissemination of information
should be encouraged at all levels, not just central.
38. Compensatory Financing.  As mentioned  above, well- targeted central compensatory resources
and policies are needed to aid inequity, particularly where demand-driven mechanisms form part of
the national reform strategy. In Nicaragua, the lack of effective compensatory policies threatens the
heart of both the health and education reforms. In Mexico, on the other hand, sub-national
administrators immediately lobbied central compensatory programs to effectively support their own
innovations. -14-
What implementation strategies are successful?
Intergovernmental transfers are powerful tools that both create the overall incentive environment
within which social sector systems operate and potentially build the basis for central
compensatory policies.
39. The formula-based transfers to local units in the Nicaraguan education and health cases provide
the transparency needed for effective and rational annual budgeting. They also provide incentives for
local schools and health units to attend to clients the central government views as a priority. On the
other hand, the lack of formula-driven transfers -- and the use instead of yearly negotiated transfers --
in both the health and education sectors in Mexico has prevented sub-national jurisdictions from
planning and budgeting effectively. At the same time it has failed to hold these jurisdictions
accountable for the funds they receive. The negotiations allow political factors to outweigh the
compensatory goals of the central government, which could, effectively, be incorporated into formula-
driven transfers.
40. Earmarking transfers in very specific ways (as is the case for both health and education in
Mexico) limits the overall effect that transferring such funds to sub-national units is, in theory,
expected to have. On the other hand, central governments can (even unofficially) relax or tighten the
actual expectations for such earmarking. In the Mexican education case, we found evidence of
creative sub-national interpretations of the intentions for earmarked funds, and a willingness by the
central government not to enforce regulations strictly. In Mexican health, on the other hand, we found
that the central government was able to take back nominally decentralized powers via tightening their
interpretation of regulations. This suggests a way of achieving “incremental decentralization” that has
not been widely recognized: the deliberate, progressive widening of expenditure categories to make
room for local initiatives -- a means that also potentially creates space for learning by doing.
41. Reforms that do not change personnel policies and practices are ineffective. The powers to
hire, fire, and negotiate salaries are the linchpins to any potential system of improvements. Health and
education reforms in Mexico have been stymied by the lack of any of these three powers at the sub-
national level. In Nicaragua, to some extent the same is true in health, but in education these powers
have been largely extended to the school and school-council level and this has both improved
accountability and held the entire reform together, even in the face of other significant problems and
obstacles.
42. Legislation need not precede reform.  Mexico has followed the more conventional reform
process of building a legal and legislative base for a reform agenda, and then implementing changes.
Nicaragua, on the other hand, effected large-scale changes via internal ministerial directives in the
absence of a firm legislative base. The dangers of the Nicaraguan model are not trivial, and they
include the potential that changes in central administration or early pitfalls in implementation may
scuttle the entire reform effort. On the other hand, Nicaragua was able to effect fundamental and far-
reaching changes in school administration and finance in a remarkably short amount of time, while
avoiding the stumbling blocks of legislative battles. In addition, the Nicaraguan model encouraged
a great deal of learning by doing that is sure to make any subsequent  legal foundation more
appropriate and effective. The conventional model makes ensuing changes far more costly. We
suggest that both Mexico and Nicaragua have important lessons to learn from considering the
attributes of the alternative strategy. In fact, the right recipe for reform in most countries is likely a-15-
combination of both strategies, even if one or the other dominates.
43. Citizen and community participation can play a constructive, and even a decisive, role in
effective local service provision, but it is not an end in and of itself and it cannot simply be
legislated. While including community participation in the reform legislation may help to encourage
such practices by putting the topic on the reform agenda of all involved, true and constructive
participatory mechanisms cannot be legislated. Unless participatory groups are given clear
responsibilities that they themselves value -- such as budgetary or personnel control -- as well as
confidence that their decisions matter and will stick, participation is unlikely to support effective
reform. Participatory groups should be given the opportunity to buy into a reform process because
they view it as being in their best interests. It is very important to offer all stakeholders an interest in
reform programs, and this can be done by offering them either money or power or both. 
44. Mexico built school councils into the reform legislation, but these councils did not have clear
powers, did not build upon existing parent associations, and exist in a system of up to ten other
councils associated with any given school. They do not function. Nicaragua created school councils
with the powers to hire and fire teachers and handle significant portions of the school budget. They
compensated teachers, who might otherwise have been losers in the system, with higher salaries. The
Nicaraguan school councils function, and they have augmented the accountability of the entire
system. Participatory groups in the Nicaraguan health reform were given less binding decision-
making powers and it is not entirely clear that their functions are indeed appropriate: they do not
function particularly well. Participation itself (which requires the time and effort of citizens) must be
treated as a scarce resource to be put to its most productive use: used in one area, it cannot be used
elsewhere.
45. Protect the crown jewels: make sure that the reform process protects popular and well-
performing programs. The Mexican health reforms essentially did away with a joint program
between the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) and the National Solidarity Program
(Solidaridad) for the rural uninsured, which simultaneously hurt service provision and tainted popular
sentiment against the reform movement in general.
46. Defining the appropriate jurisdiction for reform is important and difficult. It is also different
for the health and education sectors. The best sub-national level to produce a service from a
production technology point of view may be quite different from the administrative level most capable
of producing it. The Nicaraguan health case is a perfect example. Considering only the production
of health services, regional units seem quite attractive. However, in Nicaragua (as in many small
countries) the regional unit of government is not a full-fledged administrative entity capable of taking
on the responsibility for service provision, nor does it have elected leaders. The choice then becomes
one of  transferring responsibilities to more local units (such as municipalities or individual health
centers), or transferring control to semi-public integrated agencies, or keeping the control central. In
small countries the latter may be preferable. The point at which the actual production of health and
education takes place is different enough that pursuing a similar set of reforms (or attempting to
discern common lessons learned) can be difficult at best, wrong at worst. Education is largely
produced very locally (at the school or even the classroom level). Health on the other hand, presents
far more regional issues even in its basic production. This greatly affects the choice of the appropriate
level to which to transfer control. Nicaragua shows that schools can be an appropriate level for
education administration, but municipalities may not be. Health, on the other hand, provides a-16-
stronger case for continued central control in a small country.
How should we think about and begin to analyze “decentralization” reforms?
47. The framework for analyzing accountability presented above is a useful way of examining
institutional reform. It encourages the analysis of specific functions and discourages general (and
not particularly useful) questions regarding the degree of decentralization and centralization of the
entire reform. The framework helps us to observe how well the specific functions are organized to
achieve overall accountability and effectiveness. Thus, we advocate using the word decentralization
as little as possible and instead advocate focusing on the important dimensions of the reform.
Section II: Education Cases
Section II.1: Mexican Educational Decentralization 1992-1996
A.  Background & Summary of Findings
48. The Mexican system of primary and secondary education has undergone two major reforms in
the past 20 years that it labeled “decentralization.” The first, in the late 1970s, involved the reforms
to the structure of the Federal Government's Public Education Secretariat (SEP) without any
significant transfer of either funds or responsibilities to state governments themselves. Federal
delegations (delegaciones) were established in each of the 31 independent states in an effort to move
the locus of Federal educational administration out of the Federal District (D.F.) and closer to the
populations served. The second, explored in this case study, began in 1992 and officially transferred
responsibility for direct service provision from the Federal Government to the states.
49. During the 1980s, the Federal Government continued to dominate the financing of the sector
through a budgeting process requiring each of the delegations to compete for a national pool of
resources allocated annually by the Federal Government through the Ministry.  Most of the
approximately 1,000,000 primary and secondary teachers remained Federal employees. 
50. Since mid-century, States could establish their own education systems financed through their own-
source revenues (most of which come via the Federal revenue sharing system). These systems
remained virtually independent, with their own teachers and administrators (both state employees) and
their own infrastructure. The degree to which states chose to do so varied widely, with some states,
like Nuevo Leon, actually spending more of their own resources on their state system than the Federal
Government spent on the Federal system in their state. On the other hand, some states, such as
Hidalgo, relied almost entirely on the Federal Government's system of primary and secondary schools.
Gershberg (1995) shows that some state governments had, before 1992, significant experience in all
aspects of the education sector (including budgeting and administration) while others had practically
none. In addition, since states were allowed to develop their own systems and use their own resources
to finance it in the first place, the decision to enter the sector was, to some extent, in the hands of state It is important to note that the degree to which states contributed is largely the result of political and historical forces rather than socio-
1
demographic or economic indicators. That is, one might expect, for instance, that wealthier states would contribute more. But this is not
necessarily the case: while it is true that Nuevo Leon, a wealthy state, contributes heavily, Chiapas -- one of the four poorest states -- also
contributes relatively heavily.
  Basic education in all case studies refers to preschool, primary, and secondary school levels. The ANAM also includes initial, indigenous
2
and normal schooling.
We will refer to the 1992 ANAM and the 1993 LGE together as “the decentralization legislation” or the “1992 reforms.”
3




governors long before even the 1978 reforms.
1
51. Constitutionally the Federal Government was responsible for securing primary education for all
Mexicans while states were free to choose where to place schools within their own systems.
Gershberg (1995) provides evidence that states targeted better-educated urban populations leaving
the Federal Government to cover the more disadvantaged and rural populations.
52. In 1992, the Ministry took what it hoped would be the next big step towards decentralizing the
education sector. The National Agreement for Basic Education Modernization (ANAM), signed by
the governors of all 31 states, legally transferred the previously Federal system (teaching and
administrative personnel and infrastructure) to the states, which had to establish their own State
Secretariats of Education, if they had not already done so.  Only the National Council for Educational
2
Development (The Federal compensatory program targeting isolated communities) and Federal
District teachers remain officially employed by the Federal Government. The 1993 General Education
Law (LGE) solidified the 1992 ANAM, and gave it more legal muscle.  
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53. The combination of 1) agreements signed between the Federal Government and each state and 2)
the passage of a new General Education Law made it very unlikely that the transfer of administrative
control to the states could be reversed quickly by a subsequent Secretary or presidential
administration. Up to 1992, the transfer of administrative responsibilities to the states faced two main
obstacles: 1) governors' fears of receiving responsibility for which they were not prepared and 2) the
National Teachers Union, discussed below. The 1992 ANAM overcame the first of these two
obstacles. Remarkably, the negotiating process for the ANAM took only about three months with the
governors, though negotiations with the union essentially started in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, we
must emphasize that the critical authority to hire, fire, and place personnel was not granted to the
states, nor was the authority to negotiate teacher salaries. These facts call into question the true
importance of the responsibilities that the Federal Government granted to states. 
B.  Mexico: State-level Education Case Studies Highlights
54. The states chosen for case studies are Hidalgo, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas. One working
hypothesis was that state experience since the 1992 ANAM would vary with the extent to which each
state had developed its own non-Federal system before 1992; therefore, we chose states with different
levels of state expenditure as a proportion total expenditure in 1991 .  All three states are relatively
4
poor and relatively non-urban. All states also exhibit relatively poor educational outcomes.  And,
there is no clear, a priori relationship between outcome or quality indicators and the state contribution
to the share of education resources. 
Hidalgo-18-
55. The actual transfer of the formerly Federal system to state control went smoothly. Other than
transferring the functions of the federal Ministry’s delegado to a governor-appointed state secretary
of education, there was little alteration in the bureaucratic chain of command, the administrative
personnel, or in the major functions of what had previously been the Ministry delegation.  The
governor cleverly chose a young and capable legal expert as secretary of education, who worked at
the time under the federal Ministry's unit that essentially wrote and negotiated the signing of the 1992
ANAM with each governor. 
56. This secretary picked two well-defined programs with political overtones, and made sure that they
worked: the literacy campaign and the preschool program. The literacy campaign reduced official
illiteracy rates from 17% before 1992 to 10% in 1996, bringing the rate in line with the national
average and winning an award of international recognition.  A key component of the program was
the use of primary and secondary school teachers, who worked for extra pay as literacy teachers. This
aspect would have been impossible prior to the 1992 reform because of Federal norms. The preschool
program’s key aspect is teaching preschool students to read and write, a practice that is still officially
counter to Federal norms. However, the state has won its legal and bureaucratic battles with the
Ministry and the program has survived. Both programs provide some evidence that increasing the
freedom with which state and local actors operate, even slightly, can lead to innovative sub-national
reforms improving both production and allocative efficiency. Importantly, Hidalgo’s state level
administrators also showed acumen and innovation in lobbying and working with Federal
compensatory programs to support both programs.
Guanajuato
57. Before 1992 Guanajuato had developed its own system of education, which accounted for
approximately one third of the expenditures annually for basic education in the state. Interestingly,
this figure has not changed since 1992. In 1992, the state system had been headed by the same
secretary since 1985, and he was kept on by the governor as secretary of the entire system, including
the Federal transfers. It is clear, from this case and additional interviews with Federal officials, that
states with more extensive state systems at the time of 1992 reforms had a rich source of personnel
from which to staff the new system under their responsibility.
58.  On the other hand, these personnel still faced great administrative obstacles and the first two
years after the 1992 ANAM were filled  with concerns related to merging the two systems. By most
accounts, the system did not progress at all vis-a-vis traditional outcomes in this time period because
of this process. This does not mean that the overall administrative bureaucracy shrank. Rather, it was
re-organized: for about two years after the state inherited the Federal system, each key administrative
category had two similar posts -- a director of primary schooling for the state and another for the
Federal system, a director educational planning for the state and the Federal system, etc.
59. In the area of demand-driven mechanisms and evaluation, the state is implementing a large
number of interviews with and surveys of key actors -- especially parents, students and teachers --
to determine demand and priorities. They continue to rely on the Federal Government for macro-level
quantitative evaluations such as student exams and various attendance and efficiency criteria, but they
are complementing this information with qualitative evaluations. The results are not yet available.
This program was developed because of a sense that, given its new responsibilities, the state felt a
need to determine demand, but cost recovery was non-existent and community input inconsistent at-19-
best. The interview process, while susceptible to manipulation, is an innovative solution (in the
Mexican context) that has grown out of the 1992 reforms.
60. In terms of policy development, Guanajuato has two programs that can clearly be attributed to
the reforms stemming from the 1992 reforms. The first is a policy of municipalization, in which state
education officials have tried to a) establish municipal level offices to handle payrolls, settle work
disputes, and participate (in the near future) in planning and school construction and b) foster
stakeholder participation through municipal-level councils.  The second is a program to increase
preschool enrollment.
Zacatecas
61.The state proportion of school finance has actually fallen in Zacatecas since 1992. State officials
explain the trend saying that the declining share of state spending is due to increases in Federal
support since 1992 at a higher rate than the absolute increases of the state. We found some support
for this explanation.  Increased Federal support supposedly has occurred because the state has low
education indicators.  State officials suggested, however,  that the state is not complying with its end
of the bargain and has reallocated to other sectors state funds previously destined for basic education.
Remarkably, officials from the state Department of Finance also verified this trend. Zacatecas
provides examples of the incentive problems inherent when sub-national entities spend national
money.
C.  General Discussion of Key Reform Aspects
The Revenue Side of Education Finance
62. On the revenue side, financing has remained largely Federal (approximately 80% nationally), with
the Ministry using a system of annually-negotiated, non-transparent transfers essentially similar to
those used pre-1992. As discussed below, states have not gained significant control over either how
these transfers are determined or how they must be spent. That is, the sources of funding do not
exhibit any decentralization and the authority over the use of funds exhibits little more. Despite the
fact that the 1992 ANAM is called a “decentralization,” some traditional measures of decentralization
have not risen: As mentioned above in Zacatecas, the state share of financing the sector has actually
fallen since 1992. 
63. For another example, the data show little change in the percentage of state own-source
expenditures on basic education in Guanajuato. The same pattern holds true for Hidalgo, which
continues to rely almost exclusively on the Federal Government to finance education. This pattern of
no change seems more common than that found in Zacatecas.
64. Government data in this area are much sketchier than they were before 1992. This owes in part
to the increased autonomy given states, which now report their own-source contributions in the sector
to Federal authorities less consistently.
65. One very interesting lesson learned is that one standard measure of decentralization, the
proportion of resources raised and/or contributed by sub-national governments, is not a good
indicator of “decentralization,” or more correctly of local control. This is especially true since well--20-
designed transfer mechanisms can provide greater expenditure autonomy without transferring
responsibility for the provision of funds. In fact, such measures may reveal recentralization of certain
aspects of sources of funds. 
66. Since the sources of education revenue have not been decentralized, the transfer mechanism and
expenditure authority become critical. As discussed in the previous section, subsidiarity would call
for a relatively centralized system of revenue but a more decentralized authority over expenditure
authority.
The Expenditure Side of Education Finance
67. On the expenditure side, there has been some transfer of responsibility to states, but much less
than at first appears. The official line is that expenditure responsibilities have been decentralized. It
is true that the states receive their Federal transfers, make their own contributions to the basic
education budget, and then disburse expenditures. However, in reality states have control over only
a very small portion of the basic expenditures. Teacher salaries constitute over 90% of expenditures
in the sector, and teacher salaries continue to be negotiated in Mexico City, between the teachers
union and the Ministry, with certain involvement by the president himself. States are then left to
execute budgets 90% of which are largely out of their control. Thus, expenditure decentralization has
given states power only over that portion of the budget that is not salaries. States must also follow
regulations developed centrally.  States have some increased power to allocate teachers across levels
of schooling and, to a lesser degree, across localities within the state; thus, states have gained some
limited control over the portion of their budgets devoted to salaries.
68. The states have lost some authority.  Before the 1992 ANAM, the state systems were totally
separate from the Federal systems.  The ANAM specifically dictates the equalization of salaries and
benefits of teachers in the two formerly separate systems. Now, salaries for the entire system (both
the formerly Federal and state systems) are negotiated in the center, a fact that affects, if not totally
negates, the new state power over the non-wage portion of expenditures. This situation highlights the
importance of the personnel portion of the budget and the conclusion that without changing power
over personnel, a reform is not likely to change much else. In Guanajuato, when the Federal
Government mandated raises to teachers formerly under its employ, the state was forced to raise
salaries equally for those formerly state teachers with whom it had previously negotiated salaries on
its own.
Budgeting Processes and Intergovernmental Transfers in Education Finance
69. In addition, the federal budgeting process itself has not changed significantly. The federal
allocations to states would still be described as annual, negotiated, discretionary transfers. Interviews
revealed that Ministry officials had hoped to implement a matching mechanism in the transfers, but
faced opposition from the governors of poor states. In the years since, they have continued to try to
reward states for spending own-source revenues on education, but the process is as non-transparent
as the rest of the budgeting process.
70. In this environment, the states have had to absorb the Federal education system into their own
governments. For those states previously financing their own separate systems, this has meant
merging two systems effectively.  Viewed in the most positive light possible, the 1992 reforms can In addition to the CPS, CMPS, and APF, there are committees or councils for: the Programa de la Calidad Educativa (PCE); the Comité
5
Escolar de Salud; the Comité de SOLIDARIDAD; the Consejo Técnico, a council of teachers; the Comité de Desayuno Escolar; the
Comité de Parcela Escolar, a council of teachers, parents, and students charged with tilling an ejido for a rural school; and the Tienda or
Cooperativa Escolar.
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best be deemed an intermediate step towards a real transfer of important powers to the states in which
the  Federal Government officially transfers personnel, property, direct service provision
responsibility, and some administrative control to states but maintains both the purse strings and the
power to form general policy and regulations (normatividad) -- including determining the national
curriculum, approving the regional curricula, performing national evaluation, negotiating teacher
contracts, and allocating most resources. Strategically we may view this reform as the Federal
Government attempting to increase its legitimacy using the rhetoric of “decentralization as
democracy” while neither abdicating its own control nor seriously challenging the control of the
national teacher’s union. (Ornelas [1996])
71. Regarding regulation and policy formation, on the one hand, and auditing and evaluation on the
other, the Mexican reform appears to have reversed what would be considered good practice. 1) the
Federal Government continues to transfer resources to the states, but they audit these funds more
poorly than before; 2) they have made no special efforts to improve central evaluation, which is
precisely the central function one might consider most important, after basic finance; and 3) they
continue to tie state officials’ hands with centrally mandated and heavily regulated curricula and
procedural norms, as well as with teacher salaries negotiated at the center. Along with the
decentralization legislation, the Ministry should have redistributed funds and reorganized technical
expertise within its own ranks to weaken regulation and the “long arm of the state,” and strengthen
this important function. If funding is ever to be connected to evaluation, the Ministry must pay
particular attention to this issue.
Social Participation in Mexican Education Reforms
72. To increase broad-based participation in education, the ANAM established the school-level Social
Participation Council.  These councils were designed to be more broad based than the existing and
well-established Asociación de Padres de Familia because they include many different stakeholders --
teachers, administrators, and other community members. Unfortunately, the councils do not function
as intended. Writing participation into the decentralization legislation does very little unless it builds
on previously existing social participation and goes hand in hand with  the Federal and state
government willingness to give the participatory councils more than advisory power over school
personnel, budgets, and local curricula.  Both are largely missing in the Mexico reforms.
73. Another problem with the legislation of social participation is the proliferation of participatory
councils. There are at least ten potential formal mechanisms for social participation at each school.
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Obviously all cannot possibly function at each school, but some schools we visited had as many as
five committees attempting to function simultaneously. This phenomena, called comitismo in Mexico,
has saturated school stakeholders with organized participatory entities. In this context, the
participatory councils stand little chance of functioning widely. Nevertheless, the  State of Hidalgo --
at the cost of great administrative effort at both the state and the school levels -- has formally
constituted 4270 councils. Finding even a few that worked, let alone any that worked according to
regulations, proved difficult.-22-
D. Conclusions
74. Overall, the Mexican reforms initiated in 1992 show some signs of promise, but nearly as many
missed opportunities. The lack of any innovation in Federal budgetary practices and fiscal transfers
is perhaps the biggest, especially given that the Federal Government still provides the lion’s share of
the funds. The states administer a system whose most important fiscal attributes are determined in
Mexico City: teacher salaries and the annual size of state budgets.  Transfers are as discretionary as
they have been for decades, and they create disincentives for both the states and the Federal
Government for effective service provision. The failure to secure strong central evaluation and
auditing is salient as well. Indeed, the Federal Government has transferred some limited powers to
the states, but it has transferred more serious problems than powers.
Section II.2: Nicaraguan Educational Decentralization 1993-1996: 
The Municipalization and Autonomous Schools Programs
80. Under the Sandinista regime, the Nicaraguan system of basic education was highly centralized,
although during and after the civil war, the tradition of local payments by parents to support
secondary schools was solidified. Since the 1990 elections brought the United National Opposition
to power, there have been two distinct policy efforts to transfer more responsibility and decision-
making to the sub-national and school level. 
81. The first policy reform associated with decentralization by the Ministry of Education is the
“Autonomous Schools Program (ASP),” which is essentially an adaptation of school-based
management that combines school site councils with a system of school/user fees paid by parents. The
second policy reform labeled as decentralization by the Ministry is “Municipalization,” a program
through which municipalities receive fiscal transfers to administer  school payrolls and other limited
powers. Both reforms also function in conjunction with an effort to establish Municipal Education
Councils intended to further involve municipal and other local stakeholders.
A.  The Autonomous School Program
Basic Description of the Program
82. The ASP has grown impressively rapidly since its inception in 1993. According to King et al
(1996), about 100 secondary schools and over 200 single primary schools entered the program in only
three years. In addition 42 Núcleos Educativos Rurales have also become autonomous. These nucleos
are groups of two to four rural schools usually sharing a single principal that join together in order
to share services and administrative functions.  Primary schools became eligible for autonomy only
in 1995. In terms of scope, approximately 8,000 of the 32,000 primary and secondary pubic school
teachers in the country now teach in autonomous schools. 
83. The basic components of school autonomy involve:
￿ A monthly fiscal transfer to the school principal to pay for teacher salaries, benefits, and-23-
basic maintenance. Teachers receive their salary in cash rather than checks.
￿ The formation of a school site council charged with powers over budget; personnel; and
(officially) some curricular  decisions and evaluation and planning functions.
￿ The implementation of supposedly mandatory school fees for secondary school students and
supposedly voluntary school fees for primary students. The fees may be for monthly
attendance and/or exams; registration forms; services such as diploma processing; library
use; and other services (such as use of a computer lab). These fees are used to augment
teacher salaries or perform other operations as deemed necessary.
84. Though it represents a fundamental change in the way that a significant portion of the national
system of education is governed, the ASP is not established in national law. It has not been ratified
by the national legislature, but rather has been governed by a series of Ministry internal directives,
many of which are not in the public domain. The Ministry officials proudly proclaim that the reform
process is one of “hechos no de derechos” (accomplishments, not laws). This provides an interesting
alternative to the process in, for instance, Colombia, where years were spent constructing
decentralization policies on paper without significant implementation. This strategy has provided
some tangible benefits aside from the mere speed of the reform. The Nicaraguan government, and the
Ministry more specifically, have learned a great deal from the early experiences of the ASP -- and this
knowledge will undoubtedly impact positively on the legal framework. That is, if the legal framework
is ever developed. 
85. The danger with this strategy is, of course, that the reform is more easily reversible until it is
firmly and legally established.  In Mexico, for instance, the 1992 decentralization reform was
established first with individual agreements between each state governor and the Ministry of
Education -- and shortly followed by a new national education law -- making the reform, for better
of for worse, very difficult to turn back on. Luckily (for Ministry officials and others favoring the
ASP) the results of the recent presidential election probably assure the program’s short-run survival.
However, at the end of the Chamorro administration, uncertainty both imperilled the program’s
stability and put many participants (actual and potential) in a “wait and see” mode. Yet another pitfall
with this process has been considerable confusion (or even purposeful manipulation) on the part of
government officials and other participants over the precise rules governing the ASP.
How Schools Become Autonomous
86. The Ministry first targeted secondary schools for autonomy. The logic was that secondary schools
were larger in size, fewer in number, generally run by more experienced principals, and had a more
established history of charging fees than primary schools. In addition, the Ministry hand-picked the
first 20 secondary schools in 1993 from among large, urban secondary schools presumably based
upon their likelihood of success. 
87. Schools are recruited by Ministry delegates in each of the 143 municipalities. The Ministry
correctly recognized the need to have a cadre of local representatives to spread the program. With
support from U.S. AID, they trained each municipal delegate, teaching them the philosophy, goals,
and components of the reform as well as strategies for promoting it.  This training took place in a
central location and it is clear from our interviews that it was of high quality. The delegates, to a
person, understand and fully support the program. We say little about the teachers unions in this case study; however, we note the following: In Nicaragua fours different teachers unions vie
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for power among each other. The union with the largest membership (ANDEN) is strongly associated with the Sandinistas, and thus has
suffered a loss of prestige under the current administration. While they are staunchly opposed to the ASP and in fact have launched
publicity campaigns against it, ANDEN has not proven strong enough to block it. The fighting between unions may have allowed the ASP
to succeed.  A plain lesson that emerges is that weak union power simplifies the fight to implement controversial decentralization reforms. 
 All fee exemptions are based in part upon grade-point average. They may also then consider poverty or if the parents are teachers. We
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found significant evidence in interviews with both parents and teachers that poor parents could not and often did not pay voluntary fees. In
particular, parents of large families found the cumulative charges onerous. On the other hand, we found less direct evidence that parents
discouraged their children from attending school because of the fees, so this statement expresses a concern more than a finding. However,
one teacher did say that she felt that the fees played a role in discouraging parents from sending their children to first grade on time.
Clearly, these finding signal a need for compensatory mechanisms as discussed below.
-24-
88. The first step in the process is for the Ministry delegate to convince the teachers in the  school to
sign a letter requesting autonomy. They do not promote the program in all schools, however. They
choose schools with capable principals and teachers and large matriculation. The primary selling
point with the teachers is the promise of increased salaries supported by the school fees. This is
perhaps the most clever, if controversial, aspect of the program. Teachers would otherwise have
substantial reason to oppose autonomy, particularly because of the new power shared between
principals and parents to hire and fire teachers.  
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89. When approved, the principal travels to Managua and signs an agreement with the Minister of
Education called the School Co-management Agreement. This agreement contains the Ministry’s
promise of monthly transfers the school will receive for paying salaries and, importantly, spells out
the  policies for school fees.
School-Based Management and Fees in Autonomous Schools
90. After entering autonomy, a school is governed by the principal along with the school site council,
which always has a voting majority of parents. Consejos Directivos have an array of functions that
include approving internal school rules and physical renovation; informing the community of its
decisions; and elaborating and approving school operating plans, budgets and voluntary monetary
contributions. The Consejos Directivos have extensive human resource powers including hiring or
dismissing any school staff, including the principal. Consejos Directivos have some curricular powers
in altering, improving and incorporating different elements into existing programs.
91. By far the most contentious and controversial component of the ASP is the imposition of user
charges upon parents. They provide, first, the only incentive strong enough to win the support of
enough teachers to make the ASP process tractable. Second, they provide critical additional resources
to the sector which are unlikely to come from the Ministry, which can only be described as
remarkably cash poor. 
92. Scarce educational resources notwithstanding, the fee policies do raise serious questions regarding
the equity of the ASP and have provided the source of staunchest social and political opposition.
Central Ministry officials are fond of trying to play down the size of the fees with the analogy that
C$10 per month is only the price of two beers. But, for a typical family with average performing
students,  the monthly payments if fully collected can hardly be called inconsequential: a family with
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six children in school would have to pay C$60 per month in attendance fees and perhaps another
C$40 to C$60 per month in materials, examination, and other related fees. C$120 per month could
easily be 50% of the family’s household income. Naturally, the result is that they do not pay someAll fee exemptions are based in part upon grade-point average.  They may also then consider poverty or if the parents are teachers.  
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We found significant evidence in interviews with both parents and teachers that poor parents could not and often did not pay voluntary fees. 
In particular, parents of large families found the cumulative charges onerous.  On the other hand, we found less direct evidence that parents
discouraged their children from attending school because of the fees, so this statement expresses a concern more than a finding.  However,
one teacher did say that she felt that the fees played a role in discouraging parents from sending their children to first grade on time. 
Clearly, these findings signal a need for compensatory mechanisms as discussed below.  
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or all of the fees or they discourage their children from attending.
8
93. In primary school the fees are by law voluntary. However, instances of teachers refusing to
administer exams to non-paying primary school students are not rare, and even cases of teachers or
principals refusing to admit students occurred. In these situations, the MED delegates and the mayors
play a key role in conflict resolution by “reminding” school staff that the fees are voluntary. But even
if they are successful in supporting the students, it is hard to escape the class-based social
environment being created within the institutions that are supposed to play an equalizing role. It is
hard to make voluntary school fees truly voluntary. It is even harder to avoid emphasizing class
differences. Compensatory mechanisms must be well established and preferably implemented
transparently at the same time as the fee system.
94. Schools exhibit a broad range of fee collection strategies.  In relation to the size of the monthly
transfer received from the Ministry, total fee collection ranges from 0% to as much as 161%. In other
words, some schools derive nothing from fees while others use them to more than double their
available resources. Fee policy is set by the school councils obviously based only loosely upon
Ministry guidelines. Councils then allocate fee revenue according to the priorities they establish.
Interviews revealed that if fee revenue is substantial, the councils typically allocate half to teacher
remuneration and half to maintenance/repair; purchase of furniture or other amenities such as
computers or library books; and/or social events. However, if fee revenue is low, councils seem to
cut the teacher remuneration first.  The salary bonus for teachers ranged from 0% to 50% of their
monthly income for secondary school teachers and 0% to 30% for primary school teachers.
Unfortunately, this is probably why we found morale to be particularly low among teachers in very
poor, and particularly rural, communities where autonomy has wrought none of the promised
financial rewards for teachers. 
Stakeholder Analysis in the ASP
95. However, this observation, even coupled with fears over inequities, should not be taken as a fatal
criticism of the user fee component of the program. To the contrary, we are convinced that they are
a critical component of the Nicaraguan ASP model. A summary of the main winners and losers, in
the theoretical absence of fees, shows why this model may not work without them. 
96. Principals, at least those with leadership ability, are winners for they gain far greater control
over school functions and now answer much more loosely to higher powers. Those with vision have
the possibility of implementing it. True, principals now answer to a council in which parents have
majority voting control and the power to dismiss them. But this is a trade-off worth making for the
vast majority of capable principals, especially since 1) controls exist whereby MED delegates have
the ability to block capricious actions by the council and 2) parents are likely to follow good
leadership from school staff.  However, as Savedoff (forthcoming) points out improvements in school management can increase teacher satisfaction. In Venezuela and
9
Chile this was the case even though teachers had less job stability.
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97. Parents, too, are potentially winners, as long as they are satisfied with their representation on
the council. They gain majority control of the councils; send their children to schools less encumbered
with a distant bureaucracy foreign to them; and, according to many of our interviews and the
evaluations presented King et al (1996), may witness improved teacher and student performance.
98. Teachers, on the other hand may be losers. They neither gain majority control of the councils
nor freedom from their original manager. They may gain improved working conditions if they share
the vision of the principal and/or the parents, but without increasing teacher salaries the tripartite
symbiotic relationship between the sets of actors begins to unravel. Some remuneration is in a sense
necessary to “buy” the teachers under the auspices upon which they were “sold” the program in the
first place.  
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99. Achieving this outcome without exacting costs upon parents higher than the benefits they receive
and adversely affecting equity is the challenge of the Nicaraguan school-based management reform,
and requires a strong compensatory effort on the part of the central government. That is, the central
role is not smaller but different after well-designed reforms.
100. We found that while the central government does indeed provide added compensation to
autonomous schools in poor districts, the mechanisms are not transparent and appear to occur at the
expense of non-autonomous schools.  One suggestion would be a poverty-based match of parental
contributions where autonomous schools in poor communities would receive Ministry matching funds
for all fees collected. This would produce multiple benefits: 1) it would maintain the sense of financial
involvement that has apparently made parents more dedicated to participating in school affairs; 2)
it also maintains the increased accountability and citizen oversight that comes when people feel they
are paying directly for a service; 3) it would ensure that compensatory funds were targeted at least
in part to supporting teachers salaries, which we have seen is a critical component for the success of
the Nicaraguan model of school-based management; and 4) it would combat the inequity that results
from throwing schools more at the mercy of the endowments of their communities.
B.  The Municipalization Program and the Municipal Education Councils
101. Many countries (e.g., Brazil and Chile) have implemented policies that transfer some school
administration responsibilities to municipalities. Nicaragua, through the Municipalization Program,
is no exception. Since it is not nearly as unique as the ASP among school reforms in Latin America --
nor nearly as fully implemented -- we pay far less attention to this second Nicaraguan
“decentralization” reform here. At the same time that the Ministry first started developing and
promoting  the ASP as one form of decentralization, it formulated and began to implement a
Municipalization process that transferred certain, albeit limited powers, to municipalities chosen to
participate. When the ASP gathered steam, the Ministry appears to have de-prioritized the
Municipalization effort and only 10 of 143 municipalities have entered the program. One interesting
lesson learned is that a central ministry can indeed set up two reforms, one more controversial than
the other, as a way to hedge its administrative investments. Note that we will refer to municipalities in the Municipalization Program as “decentralized” and those not in the program as “Non-
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decentralized.” This does not imply any judgement as to the level and extent of decentralization as, for instance, in the framework in
Section I. Rather, we do this because this is the term used by the actors involved and be cause “municipalized municipalities” is an
ungainly term.
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102. The municipality operates in the sector through a Municipal Education Council (CEM, Consejo
Educativo Municipal), composed of the mayor and other municipal officials, the MED delegate,
teachers, parents, members of the religious community, and  members of the commercial sector.
Importantly, CEMs are not unique to decentralized municipalities.  They are officially required in
10
all  municipalities, even non-decentralized municipalities which have few or no administrative
functions and handle no Ministry transfers.  To the mixed extent that the CEM has taken hold across
the country there has been some increase of municipal involvement even in areas not in the
Municipalization Program. At the outset, the Ministry chose three large cities to be the first to
experiment with the  program. A major consideration for which municipalities to choose was the
character of the mayor. Each was considered talented, in favor of decentralization reforms in general,
and personally close to the Minister of Education. The next step was supposed to be the expansion
of the program to other municipalities in the departments of the three large cities. This happened only
in Matagalpa. It seems that the administrative and political energy required to expand the ASP so
quickly made it difficult to devote the needed time and resources to Municipalization. It remains to
be seen if the new administration takes it up again.
103. The CEMs have increased the participation of mayors in the education sector even in
municipalities that have not been “decentralized.” Apparently the CEMs have forged a closer
relationship between the mayors and the MED delegates and placed the education sector higher on
the list of mayoral priorities. Thus, the CEMs seem to have expedited and even increased the number
of school construction projects proposed to the central government. The interaction between the
mayors and the MED delegate and other members of the CEM has also involved more actors in the
location of new schools, and both mayors and MED delegates expressed that the choices had
improved since the CEM had been initiated.
104. The closer relationship between the mayor and the MED delegate has had other benefits as well.
MED delegates consistently stated that they received more backing from the mayor in the execution
of their responsibilities. Most often this involved small but significant support such as the use of
municipal vehicles to deliver supplies to schools (most MED delegates have no vehicles of their own)
or the provision of municipal funds or buildings for school meetings, parties, and other functions.
105. Many mayors have felt left out of the process of school autonomy. While that may be precisely
a goal of the ASP, given the role of the mayors in proposing construction projects, it could not be
considered beneficial to have mayors feeling unconnected to the education sector. The CEMs have
helped involve mayors more in the sector amidst a major reform process that could have isolated them
from it more. Also, outside of major cities, mayors are where many citizens go to lodge many kinds
of complaints. In the case of the ASP, a major complaint has been the pressuring of parents to pay
voluntary fees. The CEM has given the mayors an official instrument through which to resolve
disputes arising over fees in the autonomous schools, even if their direct power over autonomous
schools is weak.
C.  Conclusions-28-
106. Overall, the Nicaraguan decentralization reforms provide a very interesting and innovative
example from which to learn. Of course, it remains to be seen if positive results will be generated in
the most important aspect, student outcomes. In addition, if the Ministry cannot resolve some of the
serious equity issues, the reform is sure to fail for political reasons and its legacy will be increased
disparities in performance and opportunity between different and varied populations. Nevertheless,
the unique characteristic of the reform is the extensive role of the school council in setting policy for
school governance, not simply advisory functions, and the initial results indicate that this arrangement
is at least achievable and potentially beneficial. Finally, among Latin American school reforms, there
may be no other example for study in which the user fees are so sizable at the same time they are
controlled by the councils themselves. Whether or not the program proves successful, development
institutions and education analysts are sure to learn a great deal more from the experience.
Section III: Health Cases
Section III.1: Mexican Health Care for the Uninsured, 1982-96
A.  Background and Summary of Health Sector Reforms and Findings
107. For the case of the Mexican health sector, the 1980s reforms may be characterized as “partial”
or “incipient” decentralization, whereby, in 14 of Mexico’s 31 states, responsibility for the uninsured
population was transferred from the Federal to the state level, but budgetary decentralization was
limited to drugs, supplies, and general service expenditures. Even within this limited budgetary
reform, the degree of state autonomy varied over time and Presidential administration.
Notwithstanding these serious limits to decentralization, the Mexican reform case offers a number
of interesting lessons, both in terms of positive and deleterious effects on the administration and
delivery of health care and in terms of how not to decentralize.
108. The Mexican health sector comprises three basic components: 
a) the Social Security system consisting of a number of different institutions, which cover all
employees in the formal economy and are financed by employer-employee payroll taxes (in
1994 approximately 48 million people or 53% of the population, were officially affiliated);
b) the Secretariat of Health (SSA or “The Ministry”), which serves the uninsured population
and is funded through general revenues (approximately 29 million or 32% of the population)
and the Integrated Family Development Program (DIF), the National Institute for Indigenous
Peoples (INI), the Federal District Department (DDF) and the Rural Health Program run by
Social Security (IMSS-Solidaridad, discussed below) which together serve 14 million people
(15% of the population) and 
c) the private sector, which is organized around private insurance (2.4 % of the population)
and out-of-pocket payments.  Data regarding private sector coverage are incomplete, but
there is evidence that both the insured and the uninsured population attend the private sector
(with expenditures concentrated among the wealthiest segments of the population).In the Accord States are: Aguas Calientes, Baja California, Columa, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, México, Morelos, Nuevo León,
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Quinatana, Querétaro, Sonora, Tabasco and Tlaxicala.
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109. The Federal government has recently admitted that there are 8 to 10 million people with no
access to public health services whatsoever (approximately 1/4 of the uninsured population or 10%
of the entire population).  Many among this population may attend traditional healers and midwives;
there is almost no information about coverage and expenditures in this area.
110. Overall, the private sector constituted 42.7% of total health spending in 1992, Social Security
made up 44.3% of spending, and the Ministry 13% of spending.  The social security system spends
approximately four times as much per capita for the covered population as the Ministry spends for
the uninsured.  
111. Simultaneous to the devastating economic recession of the early 1980s that eventually reduced
the per capita health budget by almost half, President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) promoted
“the decentralization of national life,” as a means to fulfilling Mexico’s historical commitment to a
Federal system of government and as a tool to “achieve unity in the national development of the
geographic, ethnic, and cultural mosaic” that characterizes Mexico.  As part of this global plan and,
according to many, as a pretense for reducing Federal spending on health, the de la Madrid
administration planned the “decentralization” of health services to the state level, at once promising
autonomy to the north, equity to the south, and greater efficiency overall.   Fiscal reform was
envisioned via the 1984 General Health Law, through which the Federal government gave the states
responsibility for organizing, delivering, supervising, and evaluating health services. 
112.  As a preliminary step to a supposedly full transfer of budgetary control to the states, the
Ministry deconcentrated their Coordinated Health Services Offices in the states. These offices were
state-level, Federal delegations headed by an official who was essentially the secretary of health for
the state.  They were given an expanded involvement in the budget and planning process in that they
could propose more than before, but the final decisions continued to be made in the center. This
change was the only reform that took place in all 31 states. 
113. While de la Madrid’s plan envisioned reforming all 31 states, only the 14 states that had signed
the decentralization agreements  (here called the “Accord States”)  by 1987 ultimately implemented
the most important elements of the reform described below .  Political will and the state’s potential
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capacity to increase its proportional contribution to health spending for the uninsured  were important
criteria in this process, although many observers have noted that, with the exception of Guerrero --
whose Governor was the intellectual architect of the reform -- all of the Accord states had either a
high level of socioeconomic development and/or a medium to low poverty rate.  This has led to the
conclusion by analysts of the process that states were selected based on relative wealth and the “least
resistance” to change on the part of the state governments themselves and Social Security.
114. The dominant element of the reform was the creation of a single state system of health for the
uninsured, which entailed transfer of responsibility for uninsured populations from the IMSS-
Solidaridad and the State Coordinated Health Services of the Ministry to new entities under state
authority.   Due to the opposition of Social Security, the states selected had the least IMSS-
Solidaridad infrastructure, leaving 72% of the program’s units intact and 6.5 million people covered-30-
in the 17 Non-Accord states. (Gonzalez Block et al., 1989).   By the end of the 1980s reform, IMSS-
Solidaridad had turned over 23 hospitals and 911 rural medical units, leaving it with 50 hospitals and
2404 units for nine million people in the remaining 17 states.
115. Throughout the country, the fusion of the IMSS-Solidaridad and State Coordinated Health
Services was and remains the most controversial aspect of the reform for a variety of reasons.  First,
because not all IMSS-Solidaridad personnel joined the new state health secretariats, there was a net
loss of health personnel serving the uninsured population immediately after the fusion, even though
the number of health personnel generally increased in the late 1980s. Next, many IMSS-Solidaridad
employees were opposed to joining the state health secretariats because of inferior working conditions.
The merger was also expensive, costing hundreds of millions of pesos for salary equalization and
severance pay.  Most important, because of the broad popular support for IMSS-Solidaridad thanks
to its more comprehensive and integrated services, better staffed and equipped units, and superior
outcomes, a merger with the less favored coordinated health services was widely opposed.
116. The 1980s reform was thwarted for a number of reasons.  First the Federal government’s failure
to give states power over  the personnel budget meant that fiscal transfers to the Accord states
constituted less than one fourth of spending.  Because of their limited tax base (or ability to retain
taxes at the state level), most states were unable to significantly increase their financing capacity even
though they were assuming greater administrative costs.  Moreover, although one of the main
objectives of reform was to localize programmatic decision-making, the Federal Ministry continued
to exercise control of major program selection and overall health policy.  Finally, the fusion of IMSS-
Solidaridad facilities with those of the Ministry ultimately resulted in fewer resources and less equity,
particularly in impoverished rural areas.
117. Despite the vast legislative decentralization framework created during the 1980s,
decentralization was not only never achieved but also reversed. The Federal health reform impulse
was suspended at the end of the de la Madrid administration after only 14 states had signed
decentralization agreements.  The suspension of reform is attributed to internal reports citing a sharp
decline in quality of health services in Guerrero, Morelos and other states and to public outcry over
deterioration of former IMSS-Solidaridad services. In a nutshell, by the late 1980s it was clear that
“decentralization” reforms had not improved performance or accountability for health services and
that the health infrastructure had deteriorated in many Accord states.
118. In 1989 the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) began a quiet
reversal of the previous reforms of health services for the uninsured.  This took place through a
gradual substitution of more generalized transfers with line-by-line budget earmarking and through
the creation of several centralized public health initiatives to improve maternal and child health.
Many observers have attributed the Salinas recentralization to an improvement in the Mexican
economy and to the Salinas administration’s desire to wrest control from state governments.  This
suggests that political forces, not the failure of the legislative mechanisms, ultimately doomed the
reform effort of the 1980s.
119. Decentralization has only recently re-emerged as a major goal of the Zedillo government and the
National Accord for the Decentralization of Health Services signed on August 20, 1996 appears to
be a significant step.  Although this next episode of on reform faces a number of obstacles, because
of the importance assigned to decentralization as a policy initiative by the Zedillo administration,-31-
virtually all persons interviewed at every level of government pronounced themselves in favor of
budgetary and programming “decentralization.”  Moreover, there was at least a surface-level
consensus that “decentralization” had been carried out only partially in the 1980s, in contrast to the
plans for the Zedillo reform which was perceived to be more legitimate in its design.  Thus far only
a few activities have been decentralized, such as the transfer of check disbursement for salaries to the
states and an option for direct purchase of pharmaceutical products.
120. Summarizing the reforms with respect to the accountability framework reveals that it is hard to
call the Mexican health reforms a process of “decentralization.” States did not gain a significant level
of control over even a single aspect of the system, and most of the few new powers they did gain have
slowly been taken away from them. As mentioned above, the case provides lessons in how not to
decentralize. Despite the fact that we cannot label the reforms “decentralization,” since the Mexican
government did in fact use that label, all future efforts to implement true reform will begin with
having to overcome the legacy of these failed reforms.
B.  State-level Health Case Studies Highlights
121. State cases were selected based on their ability to illuminate particular problems of the reform
process of the 1980s or to innovate in some aspects of the performance accountability framework
regardless of whether they were officially Accord states.  Since signing the decentralization agreement
in 1985, Jalisco has introduced both training and administrative mechanisms to prepare it for the
responsibilities of it will take over from the federal government.  In areas where budgetary and
administrative authority has been transferred to the states, Jalisco’s preparation has paid off;
however, due to Federal limits on state budgetary control, Jalisco has been unable to decentralize fully
or successfully.  The case of Morelos, which possesses a similar marginalization index  to Jalisco and
thus theoretically started from a comparable level of social development, demonstrates the tremendous
problems that can be created in health services delivery even under partial decentralization.  
122. As a Non-Accord state, Hidalgo has undergone interesting innovations both in health and
education reform over the last few years.  Hidalgo, the nation’s fourth poorest state, represents an
alternate “path” to budgetary and policy reform in accordance with the performance accountability
framework despite its exclusion from the official reform process.  As one of four states benefitting
from the $180 million World Bank First Basic Health Care Project (PASSPA), Hidalgo was provided
the resources and responsibility to increase access to care for marginalized population.  While this
responsibility initially proved problematic, a new state health team installed in 1993 has been able
to take full advantage of PASSPA’s flexibility, creating its own system of service delivery and state-
level accountability.  An assessment of the Hidalgo experience suggests that decentralization may be
enabled by state demonstration projects.
C.  Key Reform Aspects
Health Finance and Personnel Management in Accord and Non-Accord States
123. In exchange for budgetary transfers from the Ministry, Accord states signed agreements
promising to increase the state contribution to public health spending.   On the eve of the reform, the
states that would subsequently sign the Accord contributed an average of 17.43 % to public health-32-
expenditures compared to 5.58% in the remaining states, a threefold difference. (Gonzalez-Block et
al., 1989)  The average state proportion of spending on the uninsured  in Accord states actually fell
from 1985 to 1987 by 37.3%, but proportionate state spending dropped even more dramatically in
Non-Accord states during the mid 1980s.  
124. Additional evidence of the consistency in spending differences between states is an internal
Ministry study comparing 4 Accord to 4 neighboring Non-Accord states which found that the Accord
states contributed 22.6% of health care financing compared to 7.8% for Non-Accord states, still a
threefold difference.  Thus, through periods of economic growth and contraction, the Accord states
did not proportionately increase their contribution to the health budget, and the three to one ratio
between Accord and Non-Accord states remained remarkably consistent before, during, and after the
reform process. 
125. Another indicator of the continued centralization of finances is the proportion of the Ministry
budget that is under state control versus Federal control. [SSA, 1995] finds that Accord states in
1994 controlled 23.4% of their budgets vs. 20.4% control in Non-Accord states, a very small
difference.  The largest reason that Accord states have gained little more control over their health
budgets than Non-Accord states stems from the failure to transfer significant control over the
personnel portion of the health budget. 
126. Other than the fusion of IMSS-Solidaridad and Ministry employees, the 1980s reform process
resulted in no significant personnel management changes for either Accord or Non-Accord States.
The existence of state health workers, with their own unions and salary structures suggests that
further reform may be complicated, as suggested by the experience with the education sector. In
theory, the Federal government has promised to pay to raise the salaries of state health workers to the
level of Federal workers, in part to allay the fears of the national health unions.  The personnel and
union decisions made for the Secretariat of Public Education reform are being used as a model for
the Ministry, but problems with the education reform resulting in recent teacher strikes may make the
assurances of union compliance with the reform plans of August 1996 far too optimistic.  Because
health workers union is smaller than the teachers’ union, there is considerable concern about breaking
it up into 31 branches. 
Eking Out a Little Real Decentralization: Policy Development and User Fees
127. In general, regulations and norms continue to be Federal, although over the last decade some
states have developed their own norms, particularly in the area of Sanitary Regulation.  Jalisco’s state
health care plan has defined a basic package of essential services that is more extensive than the
Federally recommended package (three more free services), and one jurisdiction has developed a
package with a further free service. Likewise, Hidalgo’s recently-elaborated packages of essential
services are oriented around demographic groups rather than programmatic activities and also go far
beyond the services specified by Federal norms.  
128. Policy development, distinct from regulation and norms, has seen more decentralized activity,
with states and municipalities now encouraged to develop their own priorities.  For example,
municipalities in many states now rank their health priorities based on the local epidemiological and,
to some extent, socioeconomic profile, rather than strictly following national programmatic priorities.-33-
This has led to greater awareness of local health problems and attempts by municipalities to increase
health promotion and disease prevention activities.  Hidalgo’s packages of essential services based
on age groups and social conditions have a far more preventive focus than has been typical of
Ministry services.  However, the budgeting process continues to be organized around Federal
programs, requiring state planning and budgeting personnel to carry out gymnastics to justify state
policies according to the Federal budget guidelines. 
129. In terms of demand-driven mechanisms, the main element present in Mexico has been the user
fees.  In 1994 user fees ranged from 2.3 to 16.1 percent of total health spending by state.  The use
of these funds differs by state.  In Non-Accord states, most monies stay at the unit level and are used
for the purchase of medicines and other supplies not covered by the regular budget.  Case-by-case
socioeconomic investigations are carried out in most states to determine the veracity of claims of
inability to pay for health services.  In Hidalgo 85% of the fees stay at the unit or jurisdictional level,
10% go to the state, and 5% to the Federal public welfare fund.  In Jalisco, 100% of the fees go to
the state secretariat of health where they are used to pay for personnel and other expenses. This
situation is probably unique among Accord states--elsewhere the monies go first to state coffers.
130. The exclusive state use of user fees was a small but important element of the decentralization
agreements of the 1980s; recent Federal suggestions that the fees in Accord states return to Federal
control have been met with considerable opposition.  User fees are becoming an increasingly
important revenue source, more than doubling as a proportion of total spending for the uninsured in
Accord states, from an average of 4% in 1985-7 to 9.3% in 1994-5. Although Non-Accord states
have less control over user fee revenues, these states collected almost as much -  a proportional
contribution of 6.9% of total spending in 1994/5.
D.  Conclusions & Lessons Learned from Mexican Health Decentralization
131. Summarizing the reforms with respect to the accountability framework (Figure 4 in Section I)
reveals that it is hard to call the Mexican health reforms a process of “decentralization,” or even to
say that much was changed. States did not gain a significant level of control over even a single aspect
of the system, and most of the few new powers they did gain have slowly been taken away from them.-34-
Section III.2: Case Study of Nicaraguan Health Decentralization
A.  Background and Summary of Health Sector Reforms and Findings
132. The Sandinista government created a centralized system of health services delivery, though there
was some experimentation with local level budgeting for hospitals and district health systems in the
mid 1980s which divided the country’s then 9 regions into “health areas.”  Following a solidification
of central control from 1990-1993, over the past few years the Chamorro government turned to the
Local Integrated Health Care Systems (SILAIS)  model at the departmental level as its primary
reform to manage over 800 health units and 27 hospitals in the nation’s 143 municipalities.  
133.  Interestingly, unlike some other countries in the region, Nicaragua has allowed policy
formulation and implementation to take place before the development of national reform laws.  A
series of Ministerial Resolutions starting in 1991 have led to the development of 17 SILAIS.  This
is similar to the process followed in the education reforms analyzed in Section II.2. Nicaragua's recent
reform has also taken place within the context of technical cooperation with a large number of donor
agencies. Some of these continue to have a centralized focus, while others have a SILAIS-level focus
that may or may not be coordinated with the central level.
134. As of 1995 all SILAIS were governed by unpaid Boards of Directors, made up of local officials,
church officers, people working within the health sector, "distinguished" community members, and
the SILAIS director, who has a “voice” but no vote.  Each SILAIS includes a network of primary
health care units and a secondary level hospital (that offers specialty services in internal medicine,
surgery, pediatrics, and obstetrics/gynecology).  As of February 1995 (Ministerial Resolution 36-95),
SILAIS were authorized to sell services to INSS or other private purchasers. Despite this
authorization, the SILAIS remain contractually accountable to the Ministry of Health to meet
productivity, health, and satisfaction targets in return for funds and technical assistance. 
135. These reforms were designed to change the Ministry of Health's roles to those of aiding the
SILAIS in policy development, norm-setting, evaluation, monitoring of health system performance,
and technical assistance to the SILAIS.  Nonetheless, the Ministry retains control over health sector
funding via performance agreements and continues to control staff levels and composition (although
SILAIS are permitted to fire staff).  Drugs and medical supplies are also purchased centrally to
preserve economies of scale, but purchases are now based upon the requests of the SILAIS. The
principal change that has been generated by the reform thus far relates to the local management of
the budget for operating costs (goods and services), approximately 20% of SILAIS funding. 
136. For the case of the Nicaraguan health sector, decentralization may be characterized as inchoate,
with problem definition and allocative responsibility partially located at 17 departmental level SILAIS
but with decentralized fiscal control limited to goods and services, approximately 20% of the budget.
While the fiscal control for this portion of the budget is extensive, permitting the flexibility to move
expenditures from one budget area to another, the management turnover in the Ministry of Health,
and more importantly, the absence of any binding legislation, has considerably weakened the reform
effort. 
B.  Departmental Case Study Highlights-35-
137. SILAIS cases were selected based on their ability to illuminate particular problems of the reform
process and for regional balance.  León was selected as an example of one of the best SILAIS with
the most experience.  Jinotega was selected as an extremely marginalized region with high infant
mortality.  Managua was included for being the largest SILAIS and center of the nation’s reference
hospitals.  Chontales is an example of a small, marginalized region whose administrative capacity has
been bolstered by the FORSAP program administered by the Dutch government. Finally the region
of Bluefields was included as a mini-case because of the particular problems posed by the Caribbean
region and because its political legitimacy and greater autonomy contrasts with the Pacific Coast
SILAIS. 
138. The experience of  Bluefields  SILAIS in many ways demonstrates that accountability has been
lost or confused through the reform process.  For example, the  SILAIS generated electricity debts
in 1995, and it remains unclear whether it is the responsibility of the SILAIS or the Ministry of
Health to assume this electricity debt.  The SILAIS argues that the budget allocated was insufficient,
while the Ministry argues that the SILAIS was responsible for rationing the use of electricity.
Interestengly, similar confusion over utility bills occurred through the Autonomous Schools
Programs.  Ironically, it is ultimately the Ministry of Finance, not the Ministry of Health that controls
the purse strings.
C.  General Discussion of Key Reform Aspects
139. Health spending comprises approximately 20% of total government expenditures, but real health
spending has declined by over 12% from 1992 to 1996.  Outside of the Atlantic autonomous regions,
the departments have no spending powers and cannot raise their own revenues since they are not
constitutionally recognized entities.  In sum, discretionary authority over resources at the SILAIS
level to accomplish local objectives has been highly limited.
140. There have been some changes to the budget process intended to enable further transfers of
budgetary power to the SILAIS. In the past the budget was decided on a historical basis, but since
1995 it has been based on local, formula-based requests and the efficient utilization of the prior year’s
budget.  It is not clear whether this change has been fully implemented. The old methodology of cost-
rationing specified budgets down to the detail, including the unit cost of each item (tires, gasoline etc.)
Today, the SILAIS signs a budget which is a list of responsibilities for the year based on its plan of
activities.  Both SILAIS and hospitals present a monthly budget by program and expenditure concept.
141. As of 1995 the goods and services budgets transferred to the SILAIS for primary care were
assigned based on the following adjustment factors: 1) health status; 2) access; 3) epidemiological
characteristics; and 4) health prevention indices. The formula derived from these factors is intended
to assign more money to primary care to adjust for imbalances that were created in the early 1990s.
In 1993, for example, 30% of expenditures went to primary care, 50% to secondary care, and 20%
to administration.  From 1994 onwards the central government mandated that 46% of the budget
should go to primary care, 50% to secondary care, and 4% to the central Ministry and SILAIS
administration.  While some SILAIS reported adhering to this formula, in 1995 national level health
spending was designated as follows: 26% to primary care, 56% to secondary care, and 18% to
administration.
142. A final note on the budget concerns external aid, which now exceeds $60 million, almost as-36-
much as government health spending.  It is difficult to separate the role of the Nicaraguan reform
process from the infusion of outside funds in ascribing any efficiency and medical productivity gains
of the last three years. Since these agencies are such large players in the health care budget, it is
particularly important to coordinate their specific programs with larger reform efforts to transfer
authority to sub-national entities to prevent both duplication of efforts/services and potentially
contradictory reforms.
143. As in Mexico, the failure to decentralize human resources, which comprises 65% of the health
budget in Nicaragua and over 23,000 workers, is perhaps the most important impediment to reform.
One of the main human resource problems in Nicaragua is the oversupply of doctors and undersupply
of nurses.  This has been exacerbated by the failure to decentralize personnel.  Not only does the
continued centralization of personnel prohibit the shifting of expenditures to other areas, but if a
physician’s position is replaced with that of a nurse or any other lower paid position, the SILAIS
loses the salary differential.  This has led to game-playing, with many persons working under
incorrect job categories.  It has also prohibited the redressing of physician-nurse imbalances in the
health system.
144. Despite the failure to decentralize the personnel budget, the SILAIS have gained authority to
transfer people within the SILAIS (for example moving specialists from hospital to primary care
settings) and even to other SILAIS, as long as the health workers’ union agrees to it.  The SILAIS
can also fire individuals but cannot create new positions and may not be guaranteed the right to fill
positions of fired and retired individuals.
145. Norms and regulations continue to be established centrally, but supervision is carried out by the
SILAIS, who complain that this ought to be a central responsibility.  There is agreement that far more
norms and regulations are developed than can be carried out and supervised. Policy planning has been
partially decentralized.  There is a new method as of 1995 to prioritize health problems using
following criteria (Ministerio de Salud, 1994a): 1)  magnitude of the problem defined by frequency
(%) of morbidity and mortality rates in affected group and by the importance in terms of demand for
services; 2) importance of the problem as decided by the SILAIS Board, SILAIS Administrative
Team, local government, community, and relation of the problem to national health and social policy
priorities; 3) cost of addressing the problem according to the volume of human, material and financial
resources used; and 4) susceptibility of the problem to preventive and treatment technology, such as
equipment and instruments, medicines, the input of qualified personnel, and the capacity to mobilize
these resources at the opportune place and time.
146. Each municipality devises its own priorities based on local needs, which are then forwarded to
the SILAIS.  Once scores are aggregated, the problems are ranked for priority according to the scores
and the SILAIS Board decides how many of the problems will be addressed in accordance with the
recommendations of the SILAIS Administrative Team and national health policies.  These policies
then become the basis for program budgeting.  It is not clear how much this priority-setting process
is actually used for changes in operations--although certainly the local level is now much more aware
of own health problems and budgets.
D.  Conclusions -37-
147. The government’s concept of “decentralization” here may be categorized as an end not a means.
This is not, unfortunately, an a-typical model of reform and thus yields useful "lessons learned." For
the case of the Nicaraguan health sector, decentralization may be characterized as inchoate, with
problem definition and allocative responsibility partially located at 17 departmental level SILAIS but
some transfer of fiscal control -- limited to goods and services, approximately 20 % of the budget.
(Table 7 in Section I) While the fiscal control transferred for this portion of the budget is extensive,
permitting the flexibility to move expenditures from one budget area to another, the management
turnover in the Ministry of Health, and more importantly, the absence of any binding legislation has
considerably weakened the decentralization effort.
148. As in the Mexican case, because the majority of the budget, particularly the personnel
budget, was not released to sub-national control, decentralization cannot be said to have taken
place to date.  The tight control over personnel on the part of the Ministry of Finance has had
particularly pernicious effects.  Notwithstanding the well-known imbalance between physicians and
nurses in Nicaragua, no SILAIS dares to replace a physician’s slot with one of a nurse, for fear of
losing resources.  The Ministry of Finance’s stronghold on personnel has resulted in an insuperable
disincentive to rationalizing the distribution of health human resources.  In addition, the failure to
decentralize personnel expenditure blocks organizational innovations at the local level and prohibits
local decision-making over the appropriate balance to strike between human resources, medications,
supplies, and other parts of the budget.  A recent series of IDB-funded studies on demand for health
care in Nicaragua (Ministerio de Salud, 1996 a-d) suggests that there are considerable unmet needs
for medications and health services in general.  Without flexibility to allocate resources appropriately
at the sub-national level, it is unlikely that the SILAIS or the municipalities will succeed in efficiently
meeting that demand.
149. A further problem has been caused by the separation of administration and budgeting for
primary care and secondary care.  This separation is resulting in a breakdown of referral systems,
the loss of accountability for the health of the population, and a de-emphasis on prevention.  That
hospitals no longer cross-subsidize primary care is likely to result in lower primary care funding.  The
primary level’s truncated responsibility for the patient may result in over-utilization of the emergency
room and in higher preventable hospital admissions.  The sole example of continued coordination
between primary and secondary care is in León, where there is an atypically close relationship
between the hospital and the SILAIS based on conjunctural, personal factors.
150. Nicaragua provides an example of the importance of defining the appropriate sub-national
level for receiving new responsibilities.  While the 17 departmental SILAIS appear to offer, from
a technical standpoint,  an appropriate and manageable administrative level for providing services,
the lack of legal standing of the departments, their inability to govern or raise revenues, and the
absence of representation of other sectors has created reform in a vacuum.  From a technical stand
point, municipalities are unlikely to be appropriate for many health services, so the central
government should maintain a high degree of control.
151. The rationale for “decentralization” on the part of international donors has not been
demonstrated to have succeeded.  The reform process was initiated in response to the deteriorating
quality of health services in the early 1990s and due to considerable pressure from international donor
agencies which currently favor this policy as a means to increase equity and efficiency.  However,
there is concern that international aid for decentralization is leading to more rather than less-38-
inefficiency in that the agency-funded programs--particularly those based at the central Ministry of
Health rather than at the SILAIS or municipal level--do less (with more money) than the Ministry of
Health.  Moreover, there is considerable concern about the continuing deterioration in the quality of
health care services even though some departments have shown improvements.
152. This is not to say that there is no role for international agencies in the decentralization effort.
Indeed those agencies that worked at a SILAIS rather than a central level and that participated and
coordinated with SILAIS staff were able to show administrative improvements and in many cases
literally kept the system from collapsing.  Decentralized international donor support combined with
the varying capacity of SILAIS directors and teams has led to uneven successes in reform.  Here, the
role of the more successful agencies might be taken as models of donor support.  At the central
Ministry of Health level, international agencies could help develop reform legislation and assist in the
definition of national data collection priorities and standards.
153. At the same time, the Nicaraguan Health case demonstrates the pitfalls of putting the
implementation cart before the legislative horse. While the employment of ministerial decrees
beginning in 1993 jump-started reform, the failure to legally institutionalize these changes raises
considerable doubts about the sustainability of the reform process.  In Nicaragua there are no laws
governing the health sector in general or the transfer of control to sub-national jurisdictions in
particular.  Ministerial decrees or informal changes in practice are the sole instruments guiding health
reform, leading to great insecurity on the part of administrators who are unsure of the permanence
of changes. Legal instruments were expected to be created as the reform process evolved, but political
obstacles and the ease with which ministerial resolutions resulted in reform, stymied these
developments. This result stands in marked contrast to the conclusions in the Nicaraguan education
case and points out the risks inherent in the Nicaraguan strategy. However, in a sense, this is also a
positive outcome -- a weak reform was not cast in legislative stone and therefore was not difficult to
re-work or eliminate.
154. The Nicaraguan case also begs the question of whether the transfer of significant control
to sub-national jurisdictions is the best response to the country’s needs.  The rationale of reform
in a country of the size, financial and human resources, and relative epidemiologic homogeneity of
Nicaragua should be carefully questioned.  When coupled with overall cuts in financial resources and
only partial fiscal decentralization, the process has generated resentment at the decentralization of
problems but not decision-making capacity. 
155. The conflation of the “decentralization” process with the establishment of privatized
hospital wards and managed care arrangements has been problematic on several levels.  First,
privatization and so-called differentiated services and wards have generated inequities, in direct
opposition to the intended goal of using the transfer of controls to the regional level to increase equity.
Second, privatization has been used as a means to generate extra-budgetary “decentralized” hospital-
level revenues instead of decentralizing the main budget.  A better focus might be to improve revenue
collection and distribution.  In any case, the coordination of all such reform activities is clearly a role
for central government.
156. Considerable pitfalls notwithstanding, the reform process has resulted in a number of
favorable changes, particularly in the area of policy development, priority setting, and-39-
programming. The new priority-setting process has alerted the SILAIS and municipalities of the
need for better data and data analysis in the establishment of both local and national priorities.  The
first-time budget knowledge at the local level has permitted municipalities to think carefully about
how to balance various needs and activities.  Enhanced civic participation in the governance of the
SILAIS has the potential to improve the responsiveness of Nicaragua’s health system.  Formal and
on-the-job training has given experience to the subnational levels in executing budgets, devising
means of rewarding employees, and supervision.-40-
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